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1.-ish II omc Rule 
by Galen Lewis 
By the spring of 1914, the question of 
Irish I lome Rule had been completely 
transfonned into a question of the coercion 
of Ulster. The traditional bulwarks of 
resistance to Home Rule had been 
effectively removed by the emasculation of 
the House of Lords, following their rejection 
of the " People's Budget" of 1909, and by 
John Redmond 's successful resurrection of 
the Irish Parliamentary Party from the ashes 
of self immolation following Parnell 's 
meteoric downfall. Protestant Ulster, with 
the apparent hour of "Rome rule" drawing 
nearer, abandoned the advice of moderates 
and logicians and began to take up arms 
against the crown in order to maintain it. 
Were it not for a wrong tum by the 
Archduke Franz Ferdinand's driver in 
Sarajevo, Englishman would likely have 
found themselves talked into a Civil War by 
a loud minority of Irishmen. 
The situation as it stood in 1914 does 
beg a very significant question, that being 
why hadn't such bellicose resistance arisen 
from Ulster during the two previous Horne 
Rule debates? And furthermore, why hadn 't 
the previous two bills been transformed to 
revolve around Ulster, and not Ireland as a 
whole, as the last was destined to? The 
answer is not completely clear, as it seems 
that perhaps the same resistance did in fact 
arise, the difference lying in the two years 
the bill (introduced in April of 1912) was 
allowed to fester, the Ulstermen to sabre-
rattle, and Asquith's cabinet hinting of 
coercion. 
How different was Ulster that it dreaded 
Home Rule to such an extent? The three 
provinces of Munster, Leinster, and 
Connacht were, for the most part, rural, poor 
and overwhelmingly Roman Catholic. 
Ulster boasted nearly the reverse. Out of a 
84 
total population of I, 14 7,000, roughly 8 out 
of I 0 were Protestants of various 
denominations (890, I 08) (Buckland 16). 
The ci ty of Belfast, holding a huge but 
proportional sway over the province, was a 
tremendous source of pride and wealth to 
the Protestant ascendancy and the only city 
in Ireland to bear the brunt of the Industrial 
Revolution. The resultant self-identity, 
strong, confident and British, was to be a 
huge force in the Home Rule debates. 
One prominent Unionist attributed 
Ulster's success to the fact that she had 
"turned her back on rainbow chasing, and 
has perseveringly trodden the hard , rough, 
path of constant attention to work, low 
living and strenuous effort, with the careful 
husbanding of the money that was the 
reward" (Buckland 30). This melancholy 
Protestant ethos was believed to be 
unintelligible to the province's Catholic 
minority who were thought suited for little 
more than soldiery or servitude, and then 
only assuming that they had stem discipline 
looming menacingly over them. Protestants 
acted, for the most part, courteous and civil 
toward their Catholic neighbors, but were 
horrified at the thought of them acting in 
numbers, either physically or politically. 
Like their notions of superiority, Protestant 
fears were rooted in history. The Orange 
Order drank to "The glorious, pious and 
immortal memory of the great and good 
King William, who saved us from popery, 
slavery, knavery, brass money and wooden 
shoes"1 and the Revolt of 1641 was cited as 
further proof of Catholic treachery. Society 
was indeed fractured (Buckland 22). 
1 The references of wooden shoes being to the 
French, although this is quite ironic in that we now 
tend to associate wooden shoes with the state of 
William's birth, Holland. 
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Prosperity in Ulster genera ll y, and 
Belfast specifically, was seen solely as a 
result of the Act of Union. In the words o f 
a Belfast delegation meeting with Gladstone 
in 1893: 
All our progress has been made under 
the union. We were a small, 
insignificant town at the end of the last 
century, deeply di saffected and hostile to 
the British Empire. Since the Union and 
under equal Jaws, we have been wedded 
to the Empire and made progress second 
to none (Buckland 30). 
Jt was common for Ulstermen to point to 
the Act of Union as a simple answer for 
what was, in rea lity, the complex result of a 
series of mostl y global economic factors. 
The real reasons for Protestant Ulster's 
affection for Union and resistance to Home 
Rule were probably more in line with the 
opinion of a Derry doctor, who believed that 
Ulster was "prosperous, content and happy, 
and why she should be afraid to take a blind 
leap into the dark is easy to understand" 
(Buckland 30). 
The "dark" was rule by a Dublin, and 
overwhelmingly Catholic, parliament. 
There were two main thrusts to arguments of 
resistance to Horne Rule, the evi ls of Popery 
and the evi ls of southern economics. Many 
Protestants at the tum of the last century, 
and not just in Ulster, believed that the Pope 
was intent on once again wielding power 
over the entire globe. This 17th century 
mindset fostered a legitimate fear of the 
Papacy. Jonathon Bardon writes that 
"Catholicism was regarded as an oppressive 
and backward religion and the fear that 
Home Rule would result in Rome rule was 
genuine" (Bardon 407). It seemed to occur 
to few that the Trish parliament would act 
independently of Rome as did the 
governments of nearly every other modern 
Catholic nation at the time, for even Spain, 
85 
birthplace o f the inquisition, found itself 
able to govern without the aid o f His 
Hol iness. As if the dark shadow of Rome in 
general wasn't frightening enough to a large 
segment of the community, most assumed 
that the church would sink its claws into the 
yo ung under a mandatory apparatus of 
Catholic education, or worse yet, Protestants 
would be excluded from government 
resulting in their being reduced to "hewers 
of wood and drawers of water for their 
Catholic masters" (Buckland 32). Certain 
contemporary events did not help Irish 
Catholics to shake this image, namely 
church involvement in Parnell's spectacular 
fall and the ill-timed Ne Tempere decree of 
1908; however, Protestant fears of Rome 
were, in hindsight, obviously a vestigial 
legacy of a bygone era (Buckland 30-32). 
The second line of resistance followed 
economic reasoning based on a shaky 
foundation of Protestant superiority. The 
province's leading businessmen, Protestant 
nearly as a rule, believed that a parliament 
primarily hailing from a rural environment 
would be incapable of understanding 
Ulster's economy, global and urban. Many 
feared the erection of huge protective tariffs 
in an attempt at self-sufficiency coupled 
with some backhanded Tammany Hall style 
of government that would see them all 
ruined. These fears resulted in an economic 
panic in Belfast when Gladstone's first 
Home Rule bill was announced in J 886 and 
is further evidenced by Lord Pirrie's 
decision to move the whole of Harland & 
Wolffs operations to the Clyde in the event 
that Home Rule passed (Bardon 404). 
As Protestant Ulster stewed in 
sectarian fear, the Irish mandate for Home 
rule grew, and grew quickly. Charles 
Parnell 's Land League apparatus had been 
turned into a powerful force at Westminster 
and by 1885 nearly 80% of the country 
supported Home Rule. The Irish mandate 
found a receptive ear in William Gladstone. 
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The "Grand Old Man" of British politics, 
Gladstone picked up the standard of Irish 
If omc Ruic towards the end of the election 
campaign of l 885, drawing cri ti cism and 
accusations of ill motive from all -sides. His 
motives were, and are, heavily debated. He 
likely felt that Britain owed a debt to the 
people of Ireland and that certainly fits in 
with his actions regarding the Balkans, 
where he championed nationalism and an 
anti-imperialist mindset. It is also likely that 
the balance of power in parliament, held by 
the Irish Nationalists, figured prominently 
into his decision, as did the chance to finally 
remove the problems of governing Ireland 
from the halls of Westminster. Regardless 
of his reasons, the result was an angry Ulster 
and the staunch opposition of the 
Conservative Party, strengthened by many 
defectors from Gladstone 's own benches. 
When introducing the Home Rule 
Bill on April 8, J 886, Gladstone stated that 
he could not "allow it to be said that a 
Protestant minority in Ulster, or elsewhere, 
is to rule the question at large for 
lreland ... but 1 think that the Protestant 
minority should have its wished considered 
to the utmost practicable extent in any form 
they may assume" (Stewart 2 1 ). That would 
not be good enough for Ulster, the question 
was, would she find a collective and 
representative voice to say so. 
The Ulster of 1885 was seriously split 
along party lines, resulting in many 
Nationalist gains in the general election. 
Liberal and Conservative Unionists 
contested seats that went to Pamellites on 
Election Day. With Home Rule at the fore 
of British politics following Gladstone's 
election, it was realized by many that it 
could never be successfully resisted by 
anything but a solid Protestant political bloc, 
arranged not along traditional party lines, 
but by a desire to preserve the Union. From 
the outset, these measures bore a 
distinctively regional , that is to say mainly 
86 
limited to Ulster, appearance. The Ulster 
Loyalist Anti-Repeal Union (ULARU), 
predominantly Conservative, also drew in 
the Orange Order, revived by Colonel 
Edward Saunderson in 1883, and quickly 
became the most vocal cross-party body, the 
Order having proven incapable of uniting 
Unionists on its own as a result of its violent 
rhetoric and penchant for hurling paving 
stones. 
The Anti-Repeal Union focused its 
efforts on lobbying Westminster and 
consolidating Unionist power in Ulster, but 
also devoted a fairly large portion of its time 
to spouting alanning rhetoric and extra-
political organization. At a 20,000-man 
rally on April 26, 1886 it was declared that 
if Home Rule was granted, "We shall not 
acknowledge that government; that 
we ... will refuse to pay taxes imposed by it; 
and ... that we will resist to the utmost all 
attempts to enforce such payments" 
(Buckland 2). The ULARU found its most 
vocal and powerful supporter in Lord 
Randolph Churchi ll , then at the height of his 
power and considered an eventual 
Conservative Prime Minister. Churchill, 
having early on decided "that if the G.O.M. 
went for Home Rule, the Orange Card 
would be the one to play" and praying that it 
tuned out to be "the ace of trumps and not 
the two" accepted an invitation from the 
ULARU to speak at Belfast's Ulster Hall in 
February of 1886 (Buckland 9). After 
warning the province to prepare so that 
Home Rule would not come upon them "like 
a thief in the night," his words became a 
harbinger of a future crisis: "I do not hesitate 
to say .. .in that dark hour there will not be 
wanting to you those of position and 
influence in England who are willing to cast 
in their lot with you, whatever it may be, 
and who will share your fortune and fate" 
(Stewart 22). Churchill went on to say in a 
public letter a few days later: 
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If pol iti cal part ies and political leaders 
shou ld be so utterly lost to every feeling 
and dictate of honour and courage to 
hand over coldly ... the li ves and libert ies 
of the loyalists of Ulster to their 
hereditary and most bitter foes, make no 
doubt on this point; Ulster at the proper 
moment will resort to the supreme 
arbitrate of fo rce; Ulster will fi ght, and 
Ulster will be right (Stewart 23). 
The saying was to long outl ive Lord 
Randolph Churchill ; people are still dying 
for it in Northern Ireland today. The speech 
was to put in the nation's mind the spectre 
of armed Ulster resistance, a spectre whose 
features would become clearer with each 
passing year. 
The method by which Ulster planned to 
resist " the thief in the night" was a 60,000 
man volunteer force, formed into two fu ll 
army corps by the end of May. Just as was 
to be the case in 19 12-1 9 14, prominent army 
offi cers had pledged their support and the 
Fourth Sea Lord had stated that he would 
resign fro m the Admira lty before he would 
enforce Home Rule. Non-commissioned 
offi cers were solicited to begin drilling the 
King's men (Buckland 12). Before the 
division on the first Home Rule bill, the MP 
for West Belfast stated that " there can be no 
doubt that the Loyalists are arming," and it 
seems that the movement was not limited to 
the sections of society that historicall y had a 
certain appreciation for anything involving 
guns, loud explosions, and dead people 
(Bardon 382). Quite on the contrary, "The 
word ' Resist! Resist! ' was on the lips not 
merely of Orangemen, but of Liberals, of 
those who by their pro fession were men of 
peace, merchants, manufacturers, bankers, 
medical men, and even clergymen" (Bardon 
383). Just like the Crisis surrounding the 
third Home Rule bill, a huge cross section of 
society was at least tacitly in support of 
armed resistance. The vital difference 
87 
separating the two was time. The di vision 
fo r the First Home Rule Bi ll occurred on 
June 8, 1886, the debate had been in the fore 
a mere two months. By the time the Great 
War intervened in 19 14 Home rule had 
occupied the politicians, and the nation, for 
near! y two and a half years. 
Despite an eloquent and providential 
plea by Gladstone, in which he exhorted 
Parliament to "think well , think wisely, 
think not for the moment but for the years 
which are to come, before you reject this 
bill" (Stewart 23), the First Home Ruic Bill 
was defeated by thirty votes, 93 Liberals 
having voted aga inst their own leader. The 
Conservative Party rejoiced as did the 
rio ting loyalists of Belfast, who had been 
read the Riot Act fou r days previous a fler 
having run every Catholic out of the Lagan 
shipyards and continued on in sectarian 
fervor to bum their homes. The city was in 
a state of anarchy with mob violence 
erupting in every section of the city where 
Catholics and Protestants fou nd one another 
in proximity. The riots continued for four 
more days before they were suppressed, 
only to erupt anew a month later (Bardon 
380-2). It must have seemed unli kely to 
many on the English side of the Irish Sea 
that such people were even worthy of self-
govemment. 
Ulster Unionism did not immediately 
subside following the defeat of Home Rule 
as many assumed it would. The autumn 
election of 1886 saw a Unionist candidate 
retake the Derry seat Jost to the Nationalists 
a year prior; the balance of Ulster was once 
again Unionist, 17 scats to the Nationalist 's 
16. Unionist clubs were functioning well at 
the grassroots, constituency level despite the 
loose ties that bound them to the central 
Unionist Club Council. Under the auspices 
of these clubs, U nionists did not oppose one 
another, ending the fratricidal sapping of 
strength that had plagued them in prior 
contests. By 1890 the Grand Old Man had 
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entered hi s eightieth decade, hardly the 
image o f man with fi ght le ft in him. The 
Iri sh Parli amentary Party had nearly sclf-
destructed following Pamell 's public fall. 
The Nationalists that sat in Westminster 
were hardly an inspiration for Home Rule. 
It might have seemed likely that the Irish 
storm had passed (Bardon 408). 
The election o f 1892 proved that the 
storm had merely blown out to sea for six 
years. G ladstone once again sat on the 
Treasury Bench and was once again 
dependent on the Nationalist vote, albeit 
now fractured between anti-Pamellites and 
adherents of the dead man. Once again the 
Unionist apparatus sprung into action at all 
levels, with the central Club Council taking 
on an ever more important role in the mold 
of the ULAR U in 1886. 
In June, 1892, resistance was centered 
on Belfast, the site of an immense Unionist 
rally. Under the largest tent in Ireland the 
sons of Ulster spoke to their resolve 
surrounded by miles of bunting and 
hundreds of Union Jacks. A ft er the keynote 
speaker, the Duke of Albereon, appealed to 
the "men of the north" to resist, Liberal MP 
Thomas Sinclair raised more applause by 
stating : 
Fellow countrymen, Mr. Gladstone's 
threat is a serious one, but, nevertheless, 
we can never falter in our resolve. We 
are the children of the Revolution of 
1688, and, cost what it may, we will 
have nothing to do with a Dublin 
parliament. If it be ever set up we shall 
simply ignore its existence. Its acts will 
be but waste paper; the police will find 
our barracks pre-occupied with our own 
constabulary; its judges will sit in empty 
court-houses (Buckland 16). 
Sinclair's tone was more restrained than 
that of his colleagues in Britain. At the 
annual meeting of the Primrose League, the 
88 
recently evicted Prime Min ister, Lord 
Salisbury, deli vered a benediction o r 
Unionist acti on. 1 le spoke to the effect that 
in the past Ulster had resisted the 
unconstitutional acti ons o r James 11 and 
today could be counted on to resist the 
unconstitutional actions of a treacherous 
parliament, for he did not think that " the 
people of Ulster had lost their sturdy love of 
freedom nor their detestation of arbitrary 
power" (Buckland 15). Arthur Bal fo ur 
spoke more menacingly: "Ulster can at a ll 
events fi ght; the last refuge of brave men 
struggling for their freedom cannot be 
denied them" (Buckland 18). 
As in 1886 talk of resistance was not 
merely limited to words. In March of 1893 
the Ulster Defence Council was formed 
under the auspices o f the Unionist Club 
Council; its executive consisted of the 
province 's parli amentarians. Once again old 
soldiers were lined up to take charge of the 
group and feelers were put out to foreign 
anns manufacturers. Once again 
preparations were made for Ulster 's armed 
resistance to Home rule, and once again time 
would keep the spectre at bay. 
Vocal support for Home Rule was much 
harder to come by, apart from that which 
sprang from the mouth from Gladstone 
himself. His passion was not shared by 
many of his fellow Liberals and the efforts 
of Nationalists were still hamstrung by their 
very public schism . Despite the 
inauspicious omens, sheer numbers carried 
Home Rule across the floor of the Commons 
in the summer of 1893; no other 19th 
Century bill had occupied as much of the 
House 's time (Bardon 41). The measure, 
however, would find a far less receptive 
audience in the staunchly Conservative 
House of Lords. 
The bill was defeated by the Lords on 
September 9, 1893 by 378 votes. Only two 
members were absent without legitimate 
excuse and even the infirm had been 
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wheeled in to pass through the "nay" door. 
Bardon cites the fact that no constitutional 
crisis resulted from a plain challenge to the 
representatives of the people, as ample 
evidence that the bill had little support 
among Britons in general. ln fact, it seemed 
most were glad lo sec the Iri sh question 
di sappear and a return to the normal party 
squabbles, familiar to all and threatening to 
few. The exceptions were quite obviously 
Gladstone, who handed Queen Victoria his 
resignation, and the Nationalists, who 
couldn't muster the strength to yell over one 
another to coherently argue the fact (Bardon 
413). 
More so even than in 1886, Home Rule 
seemed utterly vanquished. When writing 
of his father's career in I 904, Winston 
Churchill described reading the 
parliamentary debates of the subject was like 
walking over a long deserted battlefield, the 
issues, and even the armies, having been 
obscured by time. Churchill need only to 
have looked to Ulster to clear his vision. 
The Unionist movement did not disappear 
with the "cold storage" of Home Rule. It 
had little reason to: "The impressive 
commercial and industrial strength of Ulster, 
especially in and around Belfast, as the 
Victorian Age was succeeded by the 
Edwardian, provided Unionists with 
formidable powers of resistance when Home 
Rule once more became the central issue at 
Westminster" (Bardon 384). 
Ulster's Unionists would not have 
needed to be reminded of this by Mr. 
Bardon. They were well aware of the power 
of their position after successfully contesting 
Home Rule twice, and were determined not 
to drop their guard, even after Home Rule 
had been long eclipsed by the Boer War, 
free trade, and constitutional reform. 
The Conservative policy of killing Home 
Rule with kindness was met with little 
support from Ulster's Unionist community. 
Partly a result of institutional distrust of 
89 
Catholics and equally a product of Ulster's 
status as the last bastion of Protestant 
landlordism, growing apprehension was 
evident in Unionist ranks. Irish policy once 
again was spurred by Ireland's most vocal 
minority after the MacDonnell affair was 
"discovered" by the press. Lord 
MacDonnell was the Catholic 
Undersecretary of State for Ireland. His 
leanings were avowedly nationalistic and he 
was a member of the Irish Reform 
Association, a group dedicated to the 
achievement of Home Rule in Ireland. In 
September 1904, the Reform Association 
published a scheme to form an Irish national 
council that would have some powers of 
devolutionary government. MacDonnell 
publicly endorsed the scheme without the 
approval of the Conservative government or 
his immediate superior, George Wyndham. 
A deafening uproar was emitted by Ulster's 
Unionists, who cited the plan as a half-baked 
and backhanded attempt to grant Ireland 
Home Rule on the sly. Unionism was 
seldom held back by logic and this time 
would be no exception. They were only 
placated by the removal of Wyndham, the 
man responsible for the final eradication of 
the Irish land problem by his Land Act of 
1903. Apart from reminding the 
Westminster that they still held sway over 
many powerful men, Ulster reminded itself 
of the threat, in any form, of Home Rule. 
The controversy spurred a reform of the 
club council system into a more efficient 
and centralized body. The Ulster Unionist 
Council (UUC) was formed in March 1905 
and from its inception was the model for the 
gathering of Unionist support. It 
incorporated a fixed number of 
representatives of the Orange Order, 
officials of every grassroots county club, as 
well as all of Ulster's Unionist MP's and 
Lords. By 1910 a secret committee of the 
UUC was meeting to determine its plans to 
import arms and a Major Fred Crawford, 
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who had founded Young Ulster in 1892, was 
formally charged with that duty (Bardon 
431). 
It is Bardon's belief that "Despite 
occasional dark threats of popular resistance, 
since J 886 the Ulster Unionists had put their 
faith in parliamentary action. Now- still 
uncertain of the Tory resolve at Westminster 
and disgusted by the apparent indifference 
of the British electorate-- Northern Loyalist 
leaders firmly embarked on an 
unconstitutional course" (Bardon 431 ). By 
this reasoning Home Rule would not acquire 
a real and dangerous Ulster dimension until 
the introduction of the Third Bill in April, 
1912. But did not the Loyalist leaders 
pursue both courses every step of the way, 
abandoning their rifles only when the battle 
had been safely won in Parliament? It 
seems certain that segments of Ulster society 
would have resisted violently to the 
imposition of Home Rule. An Orangeman 
represented by a Catholic parliament is a 
hard sell today, and would have been 
ludicrous a century ago. It seems likely that 
the resistance would grow among all 
members of Protestant society as that 
parliament, in conjunction with the British 
government, attempted to impose itself on a 
province that in Thomas Sinclair's words 
90 
"simply ignores its existence." The 
difference between resistance to the Third 
Bill and those previous lay not in an absence 
of an Ulster dimension before l 9 12, as that 
is what drove the defeat of Home Rule far 
more than "the preservation of the empire" 
or any other argument against a quasi-
independent Ireland, but in the fact that 
Home Rule was certain to pass by 1914. 
The Ulstermen felt forced to throw down 
their pens and pick up their rifles, as they 
would have done, and prepared to do, both 
in 1886 and J 893. 
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